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INTRODUCTION
 
In the contemporary West, it seems that discussions of Islam are in
danger of becoming less rather than more informed, clouded by stereotype, and
prone to fundamental misunderstanding. Nowhere is this more apparent than
in conversations about “Islamic” or “Muslim” law, which sensationalistic
media often equate with dour-faced mullahs chopping the hands off of petty
criminals and throwing burkas over the heads of hapless women.
 
1
 
 The reality
of Islamic jurisprudence, like that of Islam more broadly, is both more complex
and more banal. Just as most Muslims go about their days in peace, concerned
with the mundane aspects of their lives, so too most Islamic law concerns
itself with questions of marriage and divorce, inheritance, and the best path
to a pious life. This is well demonstrated in two excellent recent ethno-
graphies on Islamic law: John R. Bowen’s 
 
Islam, Law, and Equality in Indonesia:
An Anthropology of Public Reasoning
 
 and Michael G. Peletz’s 
 
Islamic Modern:
Religious Courts and Cultural Politics in Malaysia.
 
Tom Boellstorff
 
 is Associate Professor, Department of Anthropology, University of
California, Irvine. 3151 Social Science Plaza, Irvine, CA 92697. Email: tboellst@uci.edu. Phone:
(949) 824-9944. Fax: (949) 824-4717. I thank the authors of the two books discussed in this
essay for their scholarly achievements. I also thank an anonymous reviewer, Susan Coutin,
Howard Erlanger, and Bill Maurer for their sustained and insightful feedback.
1. As a noun, “Muslim” refers to a follower of Islam. As an adjective, “Muslim” is equivalent
to “Islamic” and means “pertaining to Islam.”
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A benefit of these two ethnographies is that they are set in Indonesia
and Malaysia. These two nations are part of Southeast Asia, that region
between India (to the west), China and Japan (to the northeast), and Aus-
tralia (to the south) that has represented a major crossroads for commerce
and ideas, including religious ideas, for millennia. More specifically, Indonesia
and Malaysia are part of what is termed “Island Southeast Asia” or the “Malay
world,” a subregion of Southeast Asia that also includes the Philippines and
Singapore.
 
2
 
 In fact, Indonesia and Malaysia are adjacent to each other: to
the east, they share a border on the island of Borneo, which is split between
them; to the west, the Indonesian island of Sumatra lies across the narrow
Straits of Malacca from peninsular Malaysia, which in turn shares a northern
border with Thailand.
Taken together, these studies of the “Malay world” provide an important
corrective to the tendency to conflate the “Islamic world” with the “Arab
world.” Indonesia, after all, stretches a distance greater than that from
California to New York and is the fourth most populous country (only China,
India, and the United States have more inhabitants). Since almost 90 percent
of its citizens are Muslim, Indonesia is home to more Muslims than any
other—including any Arab—nation; Indonesia’s Muslim population is almost
equal to the Muslim population of the entire Middle East.
 
3
 
 With a population
of around 25 million, Malaysia is considerably smaller than Indonesia (though
hardly a tiny country).
 
4
 
 Islam is only one of several official religions in Indo-
nesia (the others include Christianity and Hinduism), but it is the sole official
religion of Malaysia. Virtually all persons identifying as Malay are Muslim
(throughout much of Southeast Asia, this association is so strong that the
phrase 
 
masuk Melayu
 
 (“become Malay”) is often used to mean “conversion
to Islam” (e.g., Kipp 1993, 29)).
 
5
 
Since both books examine the quotidian workings of Islamic courts in
the contemporary Malay world, setting 
 
Islamic Modern
 
 alongside 
 
Islam, Law,
and Equality in Indonesia
 
 should prove rewarding to students of comparative
colonialism, ethnicity, and jurisprudence. Clearly, Indonesia and Malaysia
present interesting similarities and contrasts, a situation complicated by the
influence of primarily Dutch colonialism in Indonesia and primarily British
 
2. It also includes Brunei Darussalam, a small independent sultanate on Borneo.
3. Despite this fact, Islam is not the sole official religion of Indonesia, and the practice
of Islam varies considerably in the archipelago. Christianity (Catholicism and Protestantism),
Buddhism, and Hinduism also have official status in Indonesia. Most Indonesian Muslims are
Sunnis that follow the Shafi’i school of jurisprudence.
4. As languages, Indonesian and Malaysian are roughly as similar as British and American
English, but due to a variety of factors (particularly colonial policy), only about half Malaysia’s
population is ethnically Malay, with the remainder made up primarily of various ethnic Chinese
groups and Tamils from South Asia.
5. But while it is assumed that all (or nearly all) ethnic Malays are Muslim, it is not
assumed that all Muslims are Malay: both Muslim South Asians and Chinese converts to Islam,
for instance, can be found in Malaysia.
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colonialism in Malaysia. These two powers brought differing attitudes toward
colonialism (in general the British were more interested in “civilizing” the
“natives” they ruled, while the Dutch usually placed greater emphasis on
economics), as well as different notions of law (English common law for
Malaysia, Dutch civil law (based upon the Napoleonic Code) for Indonesia).
In the contemporary context, both Indonesia and Malaysia represent nations
in which the place of Islam in society is hotly debated but also constantly
enacted through everyday practices of legal reasoning.
Bowen’s and Peletz’s books could be reviewed from a range of perspec-
tives, given the rich ethnographic and historical detail each provide. For
the purposes of this essay, I follow the lead of Bowen and Peletz in discussing
a shared research finding that might be surprising to some but should be
significant to all. This is that the scope and meaning of Islamic jurisprudence
in Indonesia and Malaysia is fundamentally tied to domestic spheres of
marriage, inheritance, and kinship (rather than, say, criminality, trade, or
government). Bowen and Peletz marshal impressive evidence demonstrating
the implications of this state of affairs for questions of jurisprudence, society,
and modernity. However, I will argue that the potential remains for further
explicating the ultimate conclusion to which their own data compels them:
Islamic law in Indonesia and Malaysia presumes its juridical subject is
heterosexual. Of course, this presumption is not unique to Indonesia and
Malaysia, nor is it unique to Islamic law. We need look no further than the
Western legal tradition, which does the same.
It must be emphasized at the outset that I am not faulting either book
for ignoring homosexuality. Indeed, Peletz actively works to bring issues of
homosexuality and transgenderism into his analysis, and for Bowen the
absence of reference to homosexuality accurately reflects its absence in his
ethnographic data. Instead, my point is that there is merit in asking what
consequences follow from the presumption of heterosexuality Bowen and
Peletz find in their ethnographic data. Because heterosexuality is the domi-
nant sexual orientation worldwide, it is often taken for granted and conflated
with “sexuality” in general. Pausing to consider its historical and cultural
variability in Bowen’s and Peletz’s books allows us to ask useful questions.
For instance, the particular assumptions about being male or female that
Bowen and Peletz underscore in their ethnographies assume that to be male
is to desire women and to be female is to desire men. This has consequences
for everything from notions of choice in marriage, to questions of how modern
Indonesia and Malaysia are understood as composed of nuclear families
constituted through heterosexual unions.
Foregrounding the presumed heterosexuality of the juridical subject is
helpful because it opens the door to discussing the particular forms of
heterosexuality at play in legal reasoning. For instance, in a case of conflict
between customary law (
 
adat
 
) and Islamic law discussed below, the legal dis-
pute in question sets a notion of the heterosexual nuclear family against
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another form of heterosexuality, not against a form of homosexuality. Asking
these kinds of questions challenges the apparent universality of both male
dominance (explicitly addressed by Peletz and Bowen) and heterosexuality.
Feminist legal scholars have worked not just to underscore that the presumed
juridical subject is masculine but to demonstrate the consequences of this
assumption. For instance, they have shown how associations of this masculine
juridical subject with notions of autonomy, agency, and choice shape legal
outcomes for men and women—including those women who can to some
degree fulfill the normative masculine model and those men who cannot
(Smart 1999).
 
6
 
 A similar analytical move with regard to sexuality can facilitate
asking new questions as to the effects of a normatively heterosexual juridical
subject in various legal contexts. As I discuss in the final section of this
essay, these are fundamentally linked, since it is through the assumption of
heterosexuality that male dominance equals the dominance 
 
of women
 
—as
wives, daughters, and sisters. My approach is analogous to that of early
feminist anthropologists, who challenged the apparent universal subordination
of women to men through comparative theoretical exegeses that attempted
to set forth universal reasons for that subordination (Ortner 1974; Rosaldo
1974), and through ethnographic studies investigating how that apparently
universal subordination was instantiated in specific historical and cultural
contexts. This essay is an example of the latter approach, drawing upon the
specific ethnographic materials Bowen and Peletz set forth. These materials
are of course not limited to “the local,” since the Islamic courts they study
draw upon debates and legal forms from across the Islamic world, and Southeast
Asia is in any case a region with a long history of global interchange.
Within the scope of this review essay I do not make the overtly com-
parative move of addressing, say, same-sex marriage debates in North America
or Europe. Just as my argument is not that Bowen and Peletz fail to consider
homosexuality, so it is also not that Bowen and Peletz fail to include in their
analyses data from Canada or Denmark. My argument is not that some set
of data is missing; rather, it focuses on drawing out the implications of the data
at hand. It concerns Bowen’s and Peletz’s impressive demonstration that the
assumption of a heterosexual juridical subject is internal, indeed foundational,
to the Indonesian and Malaysian materials under discussion. Bowen and Peletz
come close to naming this state of affairs and reflecting upon its significance
when they independently reach the conclusion that Islamic law is grounded
in the domestic sphere. But not all domestic spheres are heterosexual.
In my view the most important finding of these studies concerns the
forms “domestication” takes in contemporary Malaysia and Indonesia: it
 
6. Under Islamic law, for instance, the inability of a husband to consummate his marital
union due to impotence is typically grounds for divorce—not necessarily because of the inability
to reproduce but because of the husband’s failure to provide sexual fulfillment to his wife. A
particular model of heterosexuality is presupposed by this line of reasoning.
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presupposes a “modern” family composed of a husband, wife, and their
children, rather than any of the forms of extended kinship that have existed
in the region. Contained within this finding is the point, so obvious it goes
largely without saying, that this nuclear family is founded in the sexual
relationship between a man and woman; in other words, it is based upon
 
heteronormativity
 
. “Heteronormativity,” a term neither Peletz nor Bowen
employ, refers to the assumption that heterosexuality is the only normal or
proper sexuality. Naming heteronormativity does not equate to calling for
a discussion of homosexuality. Instead, it is a call for considering the impli-
cations of the forms of heterosexuality found in the data under consideration.
Heterosexuality, like all forms of sexuality, is not a genetic given but the product
of cultural forces, including—as Bowen and Peletz show—juridical forces.
Feminist legal scholarship has worked not just to address the experience of
women but to “consider the ways in which law constructs and reconstructs
masculinity and femininity, and maleness and femaleness, and contributes
routinely to a common-sense perception of difference which sustains the social
and sexual practices which feminism is attempting to challenge” (Smart
1995, 79). In an analogous manner, considering the specific forms of hetero-
sexuality constructed through various legal regimes provides an important
perspective from which to ask how, for instance, notions of “choice” in mar-
riage might or might not shape understandings of “choice” more generally.
After reviewing Bowen’s and Peletz’s discussions of Islamic courts in
Indonesia and Malaysia, I return to the theme of heteronormativity, not in
a mode of comparison with the West but in the form of explicating its impor-
tance in Indonesia and Malaysia. Because heterosexuality is still largely taken
as the default state of affairs for human relations worldwide (this is, indeed,
the definition of “heteronormativity”), it often passes without comment.
In reflecting on the ramifications of heteronormativity in Islamic courts in
Indonesia and Malaysia, my goal is to respond to this silence in a way that
can be taken up in further ethnographic and comparative work.
 
ISLAMIC LAW IN THE “MALAY WORLD”
 
From its origins, Islamic jurisprudence has evinced several features that
have remained remarkably constant despite the formation and dissolution
of a range of Islamic caliphates, sultanates, and other polities, the substantial
impact of colonialism, and the varied statuses of Islam in a range of post-
colonial contexts. One such feature concerns the ways in which Islamic law
developed through a scholarly tradition with relatively weak connections to
state power:
Governmental decrees, royal edicts, and palace codes have in some legal
systems become the bases for the development of systematic juristic
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thought. In others, notably in the early Common-Law system of Eng-
land, judicial precedents have served a similar purpose. It is instructive,
therefore, to note that none of these plays any significant part in the
development of Islamic law. What was initially preserved was prepon-
derantly the dicta not of judges but of jurists. (Calder 1993, 220; see
Schacht 1964, 209; Zubaida 2003, 4)
This distinction between “judges” and “jurists” refers to persons who actually
decide cases (judges) versus legal scholars who set forth principles for deciding
cases (jurists). This emphasis on scholarly debates rather than definitive
precedents means that Islamic law has 
 
always
 
 been marked by pluralism. This
can be seen in the formation of differing schools of jurisprudence (
 
madhhab
 
)
and the lasting importance of interpretation even after the “closing of the
gate of independent reasoning” around A.D. 900 (Schacht 1964, 70–71; see
Hallaq 2001, 238). But despite this strong pluralistic tradition, Bowen and
Peletz both note how the mistaken view that Islamic jurisprudence consists
of “a fixed set of rules” remains distressingly common in the West (Bowen
2003, 19; Peletz 2002, 65). It is here that the ethnographic contributions
of Bowen and Peletz (like their colleagues elsewhere (e.g., Hirsch 1998; Rosen
1989)) are so significant. In both ethnographies, Islamic law emerges as a
contextual process in which litigants and judges work to find practical solutions
in keeping with religious directives. This context includes relationships
between the past and present, between Islamic courts and secular legal systems,
and between competing interpretations of Islam itself.
Peletz and Bowen show us not only the suppleness, but the banality
of Islamic law as it works to settle divorces or divide property between siblings.
Their research techniques facilitate comparison: each author spent about
nine months engaging in ethnographic research on the work of Islamic
courts, including sitting in on proceedings. The courts in question were in
locales where the authors have many years of prior experience, so their
analyses are supplemented by earlier work in the region, archival research,
and textual analysis. Bowen and Peletz relate the cases they observe to
a range of factors, from local politics (they sometimes have personal
acquaintance with the litigants in question) to national, regional, and global
factors, to a range of historical factors. Their monographs thereby illustrate
the classic anthropological approach that provides “a continuous dialectical
tacking between the most local of local detail and the most global of
global structure in such a way as to bring them into simultaneous view”
(Geertz 1983, 68).
While many prominent schools of anthropological analysis have been
fairly ahistorical (for instance, the functionalist approach of Bronislaw
Malinowski, or the structuralist approach of Claude Lévi-Strauss), most
anthropological research has always combined the present-day orientation
of participant observation with a historical perspective. For Bowen and Peletz,
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this perspective sheds light on how practices of Islamic jurisprudence in the
“Malay world” reflect and depart from those found elsewhere.
Bowen weaves an attention to history throughout 
 
Islam, Law, and Equality
in Indonesia
 
. For instance, Chapters 2 and 3 provide background concerning
the Gayo region on the island of Sumatra, the ethnographic focus of the
book (and only about 300 miles from the region of Malaysia in which Peletz
conducted his fieldwork). Later chapters (like Chapter 7, “Historicizing Scrip-
ture, Justifying Equality”) also weave historical and ethnographic materials
together to show how contemporary practices of Islamic legal reasoning in
the context of courts (rather than jurists working in isolation) draw upon
multiple sources of authority.
Bowen tracks how notions of 
 
adat
 
, very roughly “customary law,” were
codified and linked to local spatial scales during Dutch colonialism (see
Boellstorff 2002). Acknowledging that these processes have apparent parallels
elsewhere in Indonesia and beyond (von Benda-Beckmann 1984; Merry
1988), he emphasizes that while Islamic law may be found around the world
and while debates over Islamic law cross borders, the practice of Islamic law
always takes place in specific cultural contexts. Bowen thereby demonstrates
what he terms “the comparative advantage of an 
 
anthropology
 
 of reasoning
and justification, one based on long-term intimacy with people in a particular
place, and a sense of the history, language, and everyday social life associated
with those people” (Bowen 2003, 8; emphasis in original). From the outset,
Bowen emphasizes that a “constant element” in his discussion will be “gender,
the equality of rights and relationships among men and women” (Bowen
2003, 5). Bowen does not consider the consequences of the fact that these
relationships among men and women are assumed not to include sexual rela-
tionships 
 
between
 
 men or 
 
between
 
 women—that is, that the presumptive juridi-
cal subject is heterosexual. Nonetheless, his analysis implicitly demonstrates
how assumptions of heteronormativity underlie Islamic jurisprudence. The
question of “the equality of rights and relationships among men and women”
that Bowen identifies as a focus of Islamic jurisprudence is quite rarely a
question of brothers and sisters, aunts and uncles, or men and women without
any recognized blood tie. It is overwhelmingly a question of men and women
in a socially recognized heterosexual bond—that is, husbands and wives. As
can be seen in the examples discussed below, it is often with reference to such
heterosexual bonds (the child of a husband and wife, the brother of a husband,
and so on) that other persons enter into juridical consideration at all.
Questions of gender and sexuality also occupy a central position in
Peletz’s analysis of Islamic jurisprudence in Malaysia. Like Bowen, Peletz
grounds his discussion in a historical perspective. For instance, Peletz discusses
the consequences of the consolidation of British power in the late nineteenth
century for Islamic law on the peninsula. In general, the Islamic officials
known as 
 
kadi
 
 or 
 
qadi
 
 found that the British emphasis on “written codes
and substantive law as opposed to, say, more informal, unwritten codes of
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operation” (Peletz 2002, 48) led to a “relative messiness and chaos” (49)
where British common law was partially combined with forms of Islamic legal
reasoning. It also contributed to the domestication of Islamic law, since “it
is clear that with respect to numerous categories of cases that the British
deemed serious, such as homicide, burglary, rape, arson, forgery, and coining
. . . Malays tended to be excluded from all substantive participation in the
judicial process” (49). It thus seems that 
 
kadi
 
 jurisdiction was expressly limited
to matters of marriage, divorce, adultery, and inheritance (50–51), though
religious matters like mosque attendance and failure to fast during Ramadan
were sometimes included as well (57). This domestication of Islamic law in
Malaya (later Malaysia) roughly paralleled the situation in the Netherlands
East Indies (later Indonesia), where “colonial rulers . . . allowed local Islamic
judges . . . to handle disputes involving family law matters of marriage, divorce,
and inheritance” (Bowen 2003, 46). In both cases a third set of laws, courts,
and informal disputing practices (other than Islamic and colonial) involved
 
adat
 
, the codification of which served colonial interests by defining local
culture as non-Islamic and highly fragmented (46–63; Peletz 2002, 56–59,
210–11).
In light of the colonialist tendency to localize culture (including law),
a tendency with a long and related history in anthropology, I would emphasize
that while in the Indonesian and Malaysian cases colonial and postcolonial
agents worked to “domesticate” Islamic law, the grounding of Islamic law
in the family is also found within Islamic tradition itself. As Pearl has noted,
marriage “has a fundamental role to play in Islamic jurisprudence. Almost
every legal concept revolves around the central focal point of the status of
the marriage” (Pearl 1979, 42; see also Anderson 1959, 4). It is also true
that since Islam’s early history, attempts by Muslims to extend Islamic law
to penal matters of crime, taxation, and statecraft have been met with resist-
ance by rulers (including Muslim rulers), often resulting in the curbing of
 
kadi
 
 power and “a double administration of justice, one religious and exercised
by the 
 
kadi
 
 . . . the other secular and exercised by the political authorities”
(Schacht 1964, 54; see also 50, 76; Zubaida 2003, 1). Forms of Islamic law
that involve criminal penalties for theft or murder have existed in the Malay
world (Peletz 2002, 26–38), but an emphasis on marriage, divorce, and
inheritance can be found throughout the history of Islamic jurisprudence.
At issue for Bowen and Peletz are the forms this “domestication” takes, particu-
larly with regard to the contemporary emphasis on the nuclear family.
The main body of both Bowen’s and Peletz’s ethnographies lies in their
consideration of present-day court cases. Both employ a case-study approach
that alternates between recounting particular court cases and commenting
on them. Peletz’s ethnography is built around thirty-six case studies from
Islamic courts in Rembau (like Bowen’s Takèngën, the district capital nearest
the rural fieldsites of earlier research). Peletz examines how Islamic courts
in Malaysia are encompassed by secular courts, whose workings continue to
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shape perceptions of what legal proceedings and judgments should look like
(a state of affairs shared with Islamic courts in Indonesia, which Bowen notes
are subordinated to an overarching secular court system). Both authors dem-
onstrate that this encompassment of Islamic jurisprudence within a secular
court system dates to the colonial period and even earlier but takes on new
meanings in the contemporary period. For instance, in Malaysia, Islam stands
as “
 
the
 
 key symbol of Malayness” (Peletz 2002, 188). Despite the fact that
there are non-Malay Muslims in Malaysia, and despite the fact that ethnic
Malays could in theory profess any faith, the conflation of “Muslim” and
“Malay” is central to the national imaginary, and Peletz discusses how Islamic
courts shore up this equation through everyday court proceedings (204–08).
This is quite distinct from the ways in which Islam is linked to ethnicity
in Indonesia, where a higher percentage of citizens identify as Muslim but
where Islam is not the sole official religion. There, debates over “intermar-
riage” reference not so much ethnicity as the related but distinct question
of marriage between Muslims and non-Muslims (Bowen 2003, 240–52).
Among the many cases examined by Peletz are two in which women
go to Islamic court to clarify their marital status (Peletz 2002, 136–41). In
the first case, the wife left home after a dispute, and her husband later told
someone else “it’s like we’re divorced.” (In Islamic law it is usually the case
that a husband can divorce his wife by proclaiming “I divorce you,” even
if the wife is not within earshot.) The Islamic judge (
 
kadi
 
) hearing the case
determined that the couple were not divorced based on the husband’s choice
of words. Since the husband now wished to reconcile with his wife, the 
 
kadi
 
left them to work out if they wished to try and save the marriage (and cohab-
itate again) or not. In the second case, a woman went to court to seek support
and clarification of her marital status; her husband had been in a motorcycle
accident four years ago, and since that time they had been separated, with
the husband apparently suffering emotional side effects from the accident
and also wishing to marry a second wife. The husband had not provided
any support to the wife for over ten months. The 
 
kadi
 
 decreed that the hus-
band’s elder brother (standing in for the husband, who was not present) would
ensure that the back payments were made to the wife. No one was able to
ascertain if the husband had ever made the necessary statement to divorce
his wife, so the case was not resolved.
These synopses illustrate several patterns in the cases documented by
Peletz and in Islamic jurisprudence in Malaysia generally. First, most plaintiffs
are women (see also Hirsch 1998). Second, nearly all cases involve marriage,
understood as a heterosexual bond between men and women. Third, while
these court proceedings typically involve 
 
kadis
 
 invoking principles like 
 
talak
 
(repudiation) without citing authoritative texts or precedents, they are none-
theless understood by all involved as Islamic law.
Like Peletz, Bowen attends to how Islamic jurisprudence works in
specific contexts of practice, emphasizing the indeterminacy of rules. This
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is a theme throughout 
 
Islam, Law, and Equality in Indonesia
 
, and particularly
in its second section, “Reasoning Legally Through Scripture.” Here Bowen’s
goal is “to consider the ways in which judges, jurists, historians, and ordinary
Muslims have sought ways to justify or critique social norms on the basis
of Islamic tenets, and to reinterpret Islam on the basis of other social norms”
(Bowen 2003, 67). In particular, Bowen explores the interplay between
customary law, or 
 
adat
 
, which “ties people to places,” versus Islam, which
as a globally minded religion “juridically displaces them” (67). Bowen’s data
indicate that “women have brought most of the cases” to the courts he exam-
ines (86). Though the gendered division appears less stark than in Peletz’s
material, Bowen notes that the courts “have served as institutions that work
in favor of female plaintiffs . . . 
 
even though
 
 on the surface the Islamic legal
principles appear to be less favorable to women” (87, 200; emphasis in orig-
inal). Chapters on judicial consensus and inheritance disputes further support
Bowen’s claim that Islamic jurisprudence in Indonesia is strongly pluralistic,
with interplay between local, regional, national, and global debates, and between
religious schools and organizations, state bureaucracies, and village and ethnic
traditions. By tracking how legal disputes take the form of argumentation
between a range of actors (rather than though reference to definitive rulings,
for instance), Bowen and Peletz show how far the anthropology of Islam
has come since Talal Asad’s observation that “In their representation of
‘Islamic tradition,’ Orientalists and anthropologists have often marginalized
the place of argument and reasoning surrounding traditional practices” (Asad
1986, 16).
We can see one example of this pluralism in the “case of Aman Nurjati’s
lands,” a dispute involving land inheritance that Bowen follows over more
than two decades (Bowen 2003, 95–99, 108–11). The gist of this long-running
and complicated (but apparently not unprecedented) family dispute involves
a conflict between Islamic law, which in theory has a clear-cut formula for
determining the shares of land to be inherited by someone’s descendants (and
which typically gives men twice the share of women), and the 
 
adat
 
 (customary
law) of the Gayo region, which tends to be more place-bound and assumes
that women who leave their natal village after marrying forfeit any claim
on village property. A 1947 ruling resulted in dividing the property between
a daughter of the original owner who had stayed in the village and her
nephew, excluding three nieces who had moved away from the village after
marrying. Bowen notes how “the court record shows little concern with the
boundaries between judiciaries, or for distinguishing between ‘Islamic law’
and ‘
 
adat
 
 law’” (98). A 1963 attempt to reopen the case (brought forward
by two of the excluded nieces and one of their sons) was denied, but in
1969 the case was successfully appealed. By this time, the judge involved
“was working in an entirely different conceptual framework from that of his
1947 predecessors. At issue for him was not whether past settlements had
been consensual or not, nor whether one should apply Islam or 
 
adat
 
, but
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rather who were the genealogically entitled heirs to [the person who originally
owned the land]” (111).
 
7
 
 This judge redivided the land so that three sisters
who had left the natal village received shares of the land, against the osten-
sible norms of Gayo 
 
adat
 
. Islamic law and 
 
adat
 
 can be seen as respectively
privileging two different models of heterosexuality.
 
GENDER, FAMILY, AND HETERONORMATIVITY
 
In contemporary Islamic law, as in contemporary Western law, “husband
and wife [are] established as the core intimate relationship around which law,
politics, and policy revolve” (Fineman 1995, 1). It is thus entirely appropriate
that Bowen and Peletz explicitly emphasize gender, and implicitly emphasize
heteronormativity, as key to the working of the Islamic and other legal
regimes they study. Based upon the materials presented by Bowen and Peletz,
it is evident that all parties involved in Indonesia and Malaysia strongly link
Islamic jurisprudence to kinship and that the gendered distinction between
“male” and “female” is the fundamental binarism organizing this domain.
In light of the overall history of Islamic law and its relative exclusion from
questions of statehood and criminal law, this focus is understandable. Yet
note again how the range of topics excluded from contemporary Islamic juris-
prudence in the Malay world is quite large. It obviously includes items like
slavery, which historically was a topic for Islamic jurisprudence.
 
8
 
 Additionally,
Islamic law is in theory attentive to crimes like thievery and highway robbery,
as well as religious offenses like failure to attend mosque or drinking wine.
Given how questions of gender predominate in the Islamic court con-
texts researched by Bowen and Peletz, it is not surprising that both focus
on gender in the final sections of their ethnographies. In this essay, I follow
their lead in turning to questions of gender, recalling issues I touched upon
in the introduction. In Part 3 of 
 
Islam, Law, and Equality in Indonesia
 
,
“Governing Muslims through family,” Bowen discusses how the centrality
of gender to Islamic law in Indonesia is instantiated diachronically in terms
of inheritance—the passing of wealth between generations of persons con-
strued as “family” through the rubric of gender—and synchronically in terms
of marriage and divorce, which “raise issues of equality of agency between men
and women” as well as “the possibility of transgressing boundaries between
religious communities” (Bowen 2003, 173). Bowen explores how debates over
gender shape notions of Islam, the public, and justice itself: “Islamic court
 
7. As Bowen sees it, the change in the conceptual framework is thus part of a large-
scale change in jurisprudential focus—from a weighing of what was interpreted as two differing
legal systems (Islam and 
 
adat
 
) to a mode of reasoning that tends to subsume 
 
adat
 
 within Islamic
law, shifting the question to one of interpretation.
8. For instance, with regard to questions of marriage and inheritance, how a slave could
become free, and the treatment of slaves (Hasan 1993; Schacht 1964, 127–30).
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judges are in an important way family law judges; all of their everyday work
involves trying to sort out disputes within a family” (210). This family, Bowen
demonstrates, is presumed to be founded in a heterosexual bond.
Like Bowen, Peletz emphasizes in the latter portion of his book the
differing ways men and women make use of Islamic courts as litigants. The
irony is that “the more the courts adhere to what are regarded as authentically
Islamic and modern practices that entail the refashioning of new Malay-
Muslim families and subjectivities, they more they contribute to the production
of a Malay-Muslim citizenry whose subjectivities and forms of kinship con-
verge with those of the nation state’s non-Muslim population” (Peletz 2002,
206). In other words, we find notions of “Islamic” and “modern” becoming
conflated through specific forms of heterosexuality. Islamic courts thus erode
the ties of extended kinship in favor of the nuclear family, disseminating
the modern notion that identities “are in a very basic sense freely chosen”
(2280). What cannot be chosen under this legal framework is something
other than heterosexual desire. Thus, this notion of choice invokes particular
understandings of heterosexuality and explicitly sets itself against notions of
the extended family. Such notions of the extended family, associated in Indo-
nesia and Malaysia with 
 
adat
 
, are also predicated on heterosexuality. However,
this notion of heterosexuality—foregrounding ethnicity and kinship and
assuming that both of these, as well as marriage itself, are not chosen but
arranged by social forces—is a different model from the simultaneously
“modern” and “Islamic” notion of heterosexuality that foregrounds the choice
of a single women and a single man for each other in marital union.
A short digression into theories of gender and sexuality will help clarify
why it is important to attend to normative models of sexuality when analyzing
the gendered nature of law. In her classic essay “The Traffic in Women: Notes
on the ‘Political Economy’ of Sex,” the anthropologist Gayle Rubin developed
the notion of what she termed the “sex/gender system,” insisting that
biological sex and cultural gender must be analytically distinguished (Rubin
1975, 159). She noted further that gender and sexuality are deeply imbricated,
since “gender is not only an identification with one sex; it also entails that
sexual desire be directed toward the other sex . . . The suppression of the
homosexual component of human sexuality . . . is therefore a product of the
same systems whose rules and relations oppress women” (180).
This suppression of homosexuality is key to what I term “heteronor-
mativity” in this essay, since it allows heterosexuality to be taken as the default
state of affairs for human relations. In a later (and also frequently cited)
essay, “Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality,”
Rubin emphasized that despite the blurry boundary between gender and
sexuality, it is crucial to recognize their social distinctiveness:
I want to challenge the assumption that feminism is or should be the
privileged site of a theory of sexuality. Feminism is the theory of gender
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oppression. To automatically assume that this makes it the theory of
sexual oppression is to fail to distinguish between gender, on the one
hand, and erotic desire, on the other. . . . [This] reflects a cultural
assumption that sexuality is reducible to sexual intercourse and that it
is a function of the relations between women and men. . . . The cultural
fusion of gender has given rise to the idea that a theory of sexuality
may be derived directly out of a theory of gender. (Rubin 1984, 307–08)
Rubin thus underscores how the mutual interpenetration of any set of social
categories—ethnicity and nationalism, religion and politics, economics and
healing, and so on—does not entail that the categories lose their integrity.
Indeed, while keeping categories distinct may be a cultural imperative in
some circumstances (Douglas 1966), in other circumstances it may be through
blurry boundaries, not clear-cut ones, that cultural categories are sustained
through time and across space.
As Rubin indicates, “sexuality” and “gender” make up an odd binarism.
It is clear that sexuality and gender are on some level distinct. In the Western
academy, this distinction has been institutionalized, albeit incompletely, in
the division between feminism and queer theory (Weed and Schor 1997).
Yet it is also clear that sexuality and gender overlap: as I have noted elsewhere,
there are no cases where a young person’s desire for a young person (regardless
of gender) would be labeled “homosexual” while that same person’s desire
for an older person (regardless of gender) would be labeled “heterosexual.”
“Homo” and “hetero,” as terms of 
 
sexuality
 
, are assumed to index 
 
gender
 
(Boellstorff 2005a).
In light of this discussion of gender and sexuality, it is significant that
the concluding chapter of 
 
Islam, Law, and Equality in Indonesia
 
, “Public Rea-
soning Across Cultural Pluralism,” draws together Bowen’s analyses to argue
that “pluralism in values and social norms . . . is an irreducible fact of Indo-
nesian life” (Bowen 2003, 257). This chapter harks back to the opening
framework of the book, in which the Indonesian material is deployed against
debates in liberal political theory concerning pluralism. This emphasis
accurately reflects the emphasis on questions of pluralism and justice in the
contexts under consideration. It is significant, however, that what Bowen terms
the “irreducible pluralism” of Islamic law in Indonesia does appear reducible
in one respect. The notion of “family” that is the landscape upon which
Islamic jurisprudence plays itself out appears to assume, across an otherwise
bewildering array of contexts, that families are centered upon heterosexual
relationships. Homosexuality and transgenderism are absent from Bowen’s
analysis, accurately reflecting the perceived incommensurability between these
topics and the public faces of Indonesian Islam (Boellstorff 2005b). In the
face of this apparent incommensurability, it is all the more important to not
take heterosexuality for granted but to ask after the consequences of particular
assumptions about the nature of heterosexual desire. For instance, how are
legal frameworks shaped by a social world based predominantly upon a need
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to 
 
choose
 
 a spouse of the opposite gender, versus one based predominantly
upon entering into an arranged marriage, where the arrangement is presumed
to involve the selection on one’s behalf of a spouse of the opposite gender?
Peletz also emphasizes the equation of Islamic law with family law, noting
that in contemporary Malaysia “In order to be a full-fledged social adult,
one must enter into a legitimate marriage (with a socially approved member
of the opposite sex) and bear or father (or adopt) children” (Peletz 2002,
188). The heteronormativity that evaporates Indonesia’s otherwise irreduc-
ible pluralism appears in Malaysia as well. From the beginning of 
 
Islamic
Modern
 
, Peletz signals an attention to pluralism around issues of ethnicity,
religion, and the public that resonates with Bowen’s concerns, though Peletz
ties his argument less to liberal political theory than to controversies con-
cerning globalization and Weberian debates over the rationality of Islamic
law. Peletz emphasizes how gender is shaped by Islamic jurisprudence:
[T]he courts help produce and legitimize modern middle-class families
and subjectivities and simultaneously endeavor to assure that allegiances
beyond the household be largely restricted to the global community of
Muslim believers (the 
 
ummah
 
) and the state . . . the sanctity of (heter-
osexual) conjugal bonds and parent-child relations are accorded highest
priority in terms of the explicit content of morally corrective exhorta-
tions and pronouncements to troubled couples and others . . . what is
noticeably absent [are] positive references to collateral relatives and kin
groupings like kindreds, lineages, and clans. (19)
In other words, heterosexuality has moved to the fore, at the expense of
what are now seen as “collateral” forms of kinship. An important issue raised
here by Peletz is precisely what aspects of this modern middle-class family
ideal are novel. The paucity of reference to collateral relatives and other
kin groupings is probably not a distinguishing feature:
The family is the only group based on consanguinity or affinity which
Islam recognizes. Islam is opposed to tribal feeling, because the solidarity
of believers should supersede the solidarity of the tribe. Intermediate
groups have left traces only in connection with succession (the ‘asaba),
with crimes against the person (the ‘akila), and with the duty of main-
tenance beyond the limits of the family in the narrow meaning of the
term; but these are merely extensions of the family and not groups in
their own right. (Schacht 1964, 161)
 
9
 
9. Peletz also links the significance of this deemphasis of extended forms of kinship by
claiming they are “seen as a drag on economic effort, hence an obstacle to the economic
development of the Malay community, which . . . continues to lag behind the Chinese and
Indian minorities” (Peletz 2002, 20). Yet in Malaysia and elsewhere, one source for the economic
success of Chinese (and to a lesser extent, Indian) communities has precisely been the exploi-
tation of extended family networks in the business world.
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The contemporary conflation of Islamic law with the domestic sphere in
Indonesia and Malaysia relies upon gender normativity and heteronorma-
tivity; both structure the modern publics to which “the domestic” is opposed.
As a result, heterosexuality marks the limit of pluralism in these nation-states;
pluralism in dominant Indonesian and Malaysian understandings is reducible
to heterosexuality and the nuclear family which that heterosexuality is held
to instantiate and reproduce. Bowen’s and Peletz’s research demonstrates how
a particular form of heterosexuality—the assumption that marriage is a 
 
chosen
 
relationship 
 
between
 
 men and women—is becoming central to the formation
of modern Islamic publics in Malaysia and Indonesia.
A salient difference between the approaches of Bowen and Peletz is
that Peletz includes a chapter (“Producing Good Subjects, ‘Asian Values,’
and New Types of Criminality”) in which he explicitly considers the rami-
fications of nonnormative sexualities and genders for Islamic law. In this chap-
ter Peletz also abandons the case-study method in favor of analyzing secondary
sources. A major reason for this methodological shift is that, as in Indonesia,
a sense of incommensurability between Islam and homosexuality means that
homosexuality was simply not present as a topic for discussion in the court
contexts that made up his ethnographic research. Homosexuality, it appears,
is assumed not to produce kinship, and kinship is the domain within which
the Islamic litigation Peletz examines is played out. The two cases to which
Peletz turns in this chapter both originate in the late 1990s: the “Azizah”
case, in which two women tried to marry each other; and the “Anwar” case,
concerning the arrest and trial of former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar
Ibrahim on charges of sodomy. Peletz places his discussion in the context
of a reading of the “Asian Values” literature as produced by former Prime
Minister Mahathir Mohamad and others.
As Peletz notes, the notion of the modern, nuclear family is organized
around the notion of “companionate marriage” (Peletz 2002, 105) and the
intersection of choice and love it entails. As I have argued elsewhere
(Boellstorff 2005a, 2007), with the demographic shift from predominantly
arranged to predominantly chosen marriage, sexual orientation emerges as
a new kind of problem. When marriages are arranged, sexual orientation is
secondary, but when marriages are based on love and choice, then that love
and choice “fail” if not heterosexual. Homosexuality thus becomes a particular
dilemma in societies where choice and love are linked to modernity: Persons
with homosexual desires fall in love, but the form of their desire falls outside
sociolegal recognition. Given that the title of the chapter in question includes
the phrase “new types of criminality,” it is surprising that Peletz does not
cite James Siegel’s 
 
A New Criminal Type in Jakarta: Counter-Revolution Today
 
(Siegel 1998)
 
.
 
 This work is useful for Siegel’s examination of the themes
of love, choice, and national belonging that are so central to Peletz’s analysis.
For instance, Siegel notes that in Indonesia “Love, justifying marriage by
the consent of the couple even against the wishes of parents, is a theme of
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nationalist novels, particularly Sumatran ones, from the 1920s and 1930s . . .
Nationalism and love are linked because through it, peoples are mixed and
a new authority is created” (16). Thus the emphasis on companionate marriage
in the “Malay world” appears to originate in multiple sources, including
Islamic jurisprudence, nationalism, and capitalism.
One possible reason Peletz does not pursue these connections is that,
like Bowen, he does not set forth a theoretical framework that distinguishes
sexuality and gender; in the absence of such a framework, the key role of
heteronormativity remains unclear. Peletz has made important contributions
to the study of Southeast Asian masculinities, but the lack of a theoretical
vocabulary for theorizing sexuality limits his ability to address the specifically
heteronormative aspects of Islamic jurisprudence in Malaysia. Homosexuality
and transgenderism are conflated in his analysis, as can be seen by references
to “gays, lesbians, bisexuals, transvestites, and all others engaged in trans-
gendering” (Peletz 2002, 250) or “the increased visibility of Malaysian gender-
transgressors, particularly homosexuals” (250, see also 295). Of course many
Malaysian homosexuals, like homosexuals elsewhere, are not gender trans-
gressors at all; they appear as “normally” gendered men and women, transgressing
only in terms of their homosexual desire. It bears noting that the distinction
between sexuality and gender, and thus between homosexuality and trans-
genderism, is quite clear in most Southeast Asian contexts and in many Islamic
contexts more broadly. This is illustrated by the fact that the contemporary
Islamic Republic of Iran supports and even finances sex-reassignment surgery
for transsexuals while vehemently opposing homosexuality.
What is lost when Peletz conflates homosexuality with transgenderism
is the insight that it is heteronormativity together with gender inequality,
not just the latter in isolation, that is central to Islamic jurisprudence in
Indonesia and Malaysia. Asking after the specific consequences of gender
in a heteronormative paradigm for Islamic jurisprudence, given that this par-
adigm constitutes an apparent point of similarity with the West, remains
an important topic for future research. Here we again see the analogy to
recognizing that the presumptive juridical subject is male—so that, for
instance, the “reasonable man” in legal discourse assumes particular notions
of self-sufficiency and agency, with consequences not just for women but for
men who are seen not to attain the masculine ideal (Smart 1995). Similarly,
the heteronormativity of Islamic and Western jurisprudence renders homo-
sexual domesticity (indeed, homosexual families) juridically invisible, but this
heteronormativity has parallel effects with nontraditional heterosexual rela-
tions: “illegitimate” children, heterosexual cohabitation outside marriage, and
so on. The fact that so-called “anti-pornography and porno-activity” (
 
pornografi
dan pornoaksi
 
) legislation proposed in Indonesia over the last few years has
often targeted unmarried heterosexual couples (said to be 
 
kumpul kebo
 
 or
“living like water buffalo”) reflects how forms of heteronormativity raise ques-
tions for legal analysis that go beyond the question of homosexuality, just
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like feminist legal criticism asks questions beyond those of women narrowly
conceived (Minow 1990).
 
BEYOND THE DOMESTIC
 
It should be evident that Peletz and Bowen have provided us with—
and I mean no hyperbole here—significant achievements of anthropological
analysis. It is possible to read each of these works in many ways, drawing
from their substantive and conceptual offerings to draw country-specific or
comparative insights regarding topics ranging from religion, law, and the state
to ethnicity and the ongoing discursive effects of colonialism. In this review
essay, I have focused on a cluster of topics—gender, sexuality, kinship, and
marriage—that act as key domains through which Islamic jurisprudence is
“domesticated” in daily practice.
It is crucial to emphasize that Bowen and Peletz both identify a powerful
and productive cultural contradiction in a public reasoning that takes place
across the domestic terrain of the heteronormative family.10 The equation of
Islamic law with “family law” thus has deep consequences. It shapes the
character of legal proceedings; for instance, Peletz’s observation that “going
to court entails airing private matters publicly” (Peletz 2002, 129) entails
the ethnographically accurate conclusion that nonprivate matters of com-
merce and criminality, among other possible topics, are quite absent from
Islamic courts in Malaysia. The “socially embedded forms of public reasoning”
that constitute Islamic jurisprudence in Indonesia are fundamentally “about
norms and laws concerning marriage and inheritance” (Bowen 2003, 5).
What Bowen terms a “repertoire of justification” (7) is a repertoire founded
in the conviction that families are heterosexual and that such families—the
modern, middle-class nuclear family in image if not always reality—are the
social units making up the nation and, in a powerful sense, humanity itself.11
Recognizing this conviction lets us see that these forms of heterosexuality
are not the “foundation” of law and society, as the rhetoric so often goes,
but the product of repertoires of justification. It is not just that legal reasoning
is socially embedded, but that the social norm of heterosexuality is legally
embedded, naturalized, and regulated through legal reasoning.
This indicates that heteronormativity is not a special, isolated topic to
be left to feminists or queer studies scholars. It appears as a cultural linchpin
that acts to mediate conceptions of proper and improper, public and
domestic—and ultimately, society and law. What are the implications of this
10. Of course, such contradictions can be found in the West as well—divorcees also go
to court in the West, and “domestic” matters of sexuality and gender have public ramifications.
11. In Islam it is often claimed that one can take up to four wives; Bowen and Peletz
both provide material discussing this question of polygamy.
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centrality of gender and sexuality for the anthropology of law? Since at least
the work of nineteenth-century ethnologists such as Louis Henry Morgan
and Henry Maine, the nexus of kinship and law has been central to theories
of culture and society (Maine 1861; Morgan 1870). Ever since, work in the
anthropology of law has taken kinship as crucial to legal regimes. However,
it seems that a need persists for a stronger theorization of the relationship
between gender and sexuality, kinship and marriage, and domestic and public.
The anthropology of law can benefit from asking how sexuality and gender,
as distinct yet interlocking categories of human relationality and subjectivity,
are taken to be the raw material producing kinship (indeed, ethnicity) through
heterosexual marriage (Schneider 1980). Bowen and Peletz demonstrate the
continuing importance of this equation even in contexts (like Islamic juris-
prudence in the Malay world) that might appear distant from both feminism
and queer theory.
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